Security as Freedom in the Quest for the Value of Human Life: A Conceptual Analysis by Ujomu, Philip Ogo & Olatunji, Felix O
TJP, 9, 1 (2017), 43-67 
ISSN 0975-332X│https://doi.org/ 10.12726/tjp.17.4 
43 
 
Security as Freedom in the Quest for the 
Value of Human Life: A Conceptual 
Analysis 
 
 
Philip Ogo Ujomu * and Felix O Olatunji† 
Abstract 
This article attempts to demonstrate that the problem of 
national and human security is a product of deficits 
arising from the governance in nations wherein 
protection, peace and well-being of the citizens are not 
considered to be of primary importance. The article traces 
the conceptualisations of security in the work of several 
philosophers with primary focus on Jeremy Bentham to 
propose an alternative conceptual analysis of security as 
„freedom from evil‟. In examining several parameters of 
social progress, the authors offer a critical evaluation of 
current security practices. They propose that the security 
practices have failed to achieve stability and viability in 
several nations because of the conceptual gap between 
understanding security as founded on the social-
philosophical principles of human value and dignity, and 
the current conceptualisations of security, prevalent in 
most nations, as a mechanism of inducing fear and driven 
by hunger for power, egoism, crass military might and 
brute force.  
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Introduction 
The problems of national and human security in this modern era 
can be seen easily in the deficits in the promotion of the value of 
human life. There is an inability of the various governments and 
state agencies to consistently and institutionally guarantee the 
adequate protection, peace and well-being of their citizens. It is 
pertinent therefore, to ask what the benefits of simplifying and 
clarifying the meaning of security for social action are. Are there 
any practical and theoretical benefits that accrue from a conceptual 
analysis of security as freedom from evil? How can a 
conceptualisation of security construed in a wider sense of an 
application of social principles like values, visions, imagination, to 
name a few help us situate the parameters of social progress? What 
set of other human and humane values beyond the propagation 
and operations of mere raw power, naked fear, unbridled egoism, 
crass military might and brute force can be adopted as the directing 
principles of stable and viable security?  
Jeremy Bentham’s Philosophical Analysis of the Idea of 
Security: A Conceptual Framework  
The ideas of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham most aptly 
picture the character and trajectory of a philosophical interest in 
security. Scholars have observed that Bentham‟s theory of security 
seeks to make a connection between property and security by 
weaving a theory around the concepts of community, law, 
punishment and evil. The primary concern of Bentham was to 
“establish a code of laws-a social system-which would 
automatically make men virtuous” (Russell, 1995, p. 741). This 
concern was situated against the backdrop of a thorough devotion 
to intellectually benefiting humanity by introducing “into morals 
and politics, habits of thought and modes of investigation, essential 
to the idea of science. Bentham‟s method may be shortly described 
as the method of detail, hence his interminable classifications, his 
elaborate demonstrations of the most acknowledged truths” (Mill 
1974, p. 85). 
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In his theorising on the ideas of security, Bentham is clear on the 
following presuppositions. Security can only come from the 
principle of utility, which serves to promote the interest of the 
community. The interest of the community can also be understood 
in terms of the principle of the ascetic. For Bentham, utility and 
asceticism taken together, “may be considered as having been a 
measure of security” (Bentham, 1971, p. 264). The task of security is 
the more important when juxtaposed with the overwhelming role 
of law to obstruct the stocking of the “body politic with the breed 
of highway men, housebreakers, or incendiaries, swarms of idle 
pensioners, useless placemen, robbery” (Bentham, 1971, pp. 264-
270). Thus Bentham insists that security can be maintained if those 
concerned know and play their parts effectively. As such, “the 
business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, 
by punishing and rewarding” (Bentham, 1971, p. 267).  
For Bentham a security problem can be encountered knowingly or 
unknowingly. Hence, “when a man suffers, it is not always that he 
knows what he suffers by” (Bentham, 1971, p. 266). But Bentham 
makes it clear that an act violating security can be a mischief. This 
can be classified as primary, where it affects specific or assignable 
individuals or secondary, where its outcomes extend to the 
community. At the secondary level, a mischief can be construed as 
a pain, where people worry about the insecurity they may face or a 
danger, the actual risks open to those that are most vulnerable to 
the threat (Bentham, 1971, pp. 268-269). Thus, Bentham arrived at 
the conclusion that insecurity can be said to be an evil that has both 
immediate and remote consequences. There are different kinds of 
evil. We have “evil of the offence and evil of the law; every law is 
evil for every law is an infraction of liberty. An evil seldom comes 
alone. A portion of evil can hardly fall upon an individual, without 
spreading on every side, as from a centre” (Bentham, 1972, pp. 204-
205).  
Bentham insists that insecurity was to be seen as an evil that had 
the strong potential for dispersal and projection. Insecurity of the 
first order impacts on assignable persons. Primitive insecurity 
impacts directly on the victim. Derivative insecurity impacts on the 
well wishers and beneficiaries of the victim. Divided insecurity is 
defined by a loss that is not exclusively the victim‟s burden, but 
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rather a shared liability. Consequential insecurity can be the further 
losses incurred by a victim after the primary loss. Insecurity can be 
permanent where the loss incurred by the victim is final or 
irreparable. Insecurity can also be evanescent where it is capable of 
being forgotten by restoration or obliteration. Insecurity of the 
second order permeates the entire society. Second order insecurity 
can be based on alarm or the fear and anxiety of falling victim. At 
another level, second order insecurity can be based on danger or 
the fear that such threats will proliferate and mutate in other 
sundry evils. Furthermore, insecurity of the second order can be 
extended where it embraces a large class of affected persons 
(Bentham, 1972, pp. 206-207). 
Bentham therefore insists that the law has a key part to play in the 
provision and maintenance of security. In his view, “the general 
object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to 
augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in 
the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, everything that tends to 
subtract from that happiness” (Bentham, 1971, p. 270). Put more 
directly, Bentham was of the view that “civil law should have four 
aims: subsistence, abundance, security, and equality” (Russell, 
1995, p. 742). According to Bentham, security is a dominant end of 
civil law, thus it “acts injurious to security, branded by prohibition 
of law, receive the quality of offences” (Bentham, 1978, p. 42). 
Therefore, security is an object of law in so far as it necessarily 
embraces the future. Insecurity is capable of overturning social 
order. Without security, nothing is attainable, that is why the law 
must engage with matters of security. Thus “in legislation, the most 
important object is security, laws are directly made for security” 
(Bentham, 1978, p. 43).  
Bentham emphasises on the powers of laws as guarantors of 
subsistence, understood as existing, remaining alive or surviving 
either as individuals or groups. Therefore he argues that laws are 
effective to the extent that they “provide for subsistence indirectly, 
by protecting men while they labour, and by making them sure of 
the fruits of their labour” (Bentham, 1978, p. 44). The connection 
between laws and security are profoundly valuable when we 
realise that existence and survival can be threatened by variable 
factors such as “bad seasons, wars, and accidents of all kinds” 
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(Bentham, 1978, p. 45). It is for these reasons that laws are also 
made to serve as buffers for the periods of vulnerability and 
insecurity. Therefore the work of law is to enhance the prospects of 
man, not only “to secure him from actual loss, but also to guarantee 
him, as far as possible, against future loss” (Bentham, 1978, p. 50).  
It becomes clear that the law is central to establishing security for 
the reason that everything that is of value centers on man and his 
possessions. A human-centered conception of security must be 
conceived in combination with other vital notions such as values, 
vision, human nature, cosmology and genealogy. Security remains 
an imperative for the humanity and is not only good, but also, an 
essential public good, in so far as insecurity is seen as an evil. 
Bentham further holds that poverty, exploitation and stupefaction 
are signs of insecurity. Therefore, non-possession or the loss of a 
good, knowingly or otherwise, is insecurity. If my possessions are 
part of my expectations, then insecurity comes from either 
dispossession or the pain of losing my possessions. Also, where 
dispossession is quite strong to vitiate existing supplies of 
materials, then the results can be understood as the following 
The fear of losing prevents us from enjoying what 
we already possess, besides, I am unwilling to give 
myself cares which will only be profitable to my 
enemies (Bentham, 1978, p. 54).  
Therefore, it is security that has turned “frightful solitude, 
impenetrable forests, or sterile plains, stagnant waters and impure 
vapours” (Bentham, 1978, p. 56) into cultivated fields, pastures, 
habitations, rising cites, roads, harbours, and other abundances of 
human imaginative ability. Thus, from the above analysis, Bentham 
is right to say that man has a definite picture of the progress of 
security and “it is necessary to prolong his idea of security through 
all the perspectives which his imagination is capable of measuring. 
This presentiment is called “the expectation, the power of forming 
a general plan of conduct” (Bentham, 1978, pp. 50-51). Let us 
examine some key concepts in security arising from the above 
analysis starting with imagination.  
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Imagination and the Quest for Security  
A possibility of an original security theorising or conceptual 
discourse cannot be separated from a review of the concept of 
imagination. According to Thatcher (1997, p. 51) “the power of 
reason and imagination is undeniable. By man‟s ability to think, 
science is possible; by the sheer power of the creative mind, men 
have travelled to the moon and released the enormous power of the 
atom.” By man‟s ability to continuously think and evolve, some 
level of security is possible. It has been emphasised that building 
up human talent constitutes the linchpin of national security 
whereby more work needs to be done in increasing scientific 
discoveries and outputs in the areas of technology, education and 
languages for instance. This is the view of America‟s security 
requirements in the current era (Kay, 2012, p. 333). Specifically in 
the domain of security, “the thief‟s imagination is the only limiting 
factor. Today‟s battles with criminals are far more often battles of 
intellect than they are of muscle” (Fischer & Green, 1992, pp. 460-
462). 
On the issue of imagination, Russow (1978, p. 57) states that 
“imagination is part of the mental life of most people, and, as such 
deserves to be considered as a legitimate topic in philosophy of 
mind.” Also, we insist that imagination is a legitimate topic in the 
discussion of security. In confronting this problem, we cannot 
avoid some level of theorising such as is available within 
metaphysics and modality, as well as philosophy of mind, and so 
forth. That or being which is necessary for conceiving a viable idea 
of security is the power of imagination.  
Given that there are basic data or impressions in the world around 
us, and the nature of such data is varied, then everyone may not 
have the same capability for processing these data, in the same 
way, at the same time, and even with the same level of imagination. 
In discussing the idea of imagination and its linkage to security, we 
can appeal to Ryle (1973, pp. 117-119) who holds that imagining is 
linked to the concept of „seeing‟ or picturing. People are capable of 
„picturing‟ or „visualising‟ things. The operations of imagining are 
exercises of mental powers. However, Ryle‟s view raises the 
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problem of whether there is only one univocal idea of picturing or 
visualising.  
Shorter (1973, pp. 155-156) holds that the notion of „imagining‟ can 
be clarified by distinguishing visualising or picturing, from the sort 
of imagining that a drunkard does. A perfectly healthy woman, 
who casts her mind back to some experience, is engaged in an 
experience that is different from that of a person suffering from 
„delirium tremens‟ or hallucinations occasioned by high fever. 
Although Shorter (1973) holds that to visualise, is to do something, 
yet he notes that a man‟s excellence at visualising may not count at 
all in favour of saying that he is imaginative. Indeed, the fact that 
one can visualise complicated diagrams, solve problems in her 
head or have a good visual memory does not mean that one is 
imaginative. Rather, the notion of imagination is close to that of 
originality. 
In discussing the idea of imagination and its linkages with the 
futuristic realms of real and possible worlds, we can still appeal 
mildly to the view that imagining is linked to the concept of 
„seeing‟ or „picturing‟. What do we see? What can we picture? A 
range of things can be pictured; simple or complex ideas, mental or 
physical images, logical or factual possibilities, fictional or actual 
existents, spiritual or abstract categories, micro-or macro – life 
forms, ontological or cosmological entities. Given whatever it is 
that we see, Rabb (1975, p. 76) has insisted that “this imaging or 
imagining consciousness is necessarily intentional. That is, it must 
be a consciousness of something.” This point is shared by Russow 
(1978, p. 57) who says that “when we imagine we always imagine 
something, but the object imagined is usually not present, and may 
not really exist at all.” People are capable of „picturing‟ or 
„visualising‟ things. The operations of imagining are exercises of 
mental powers. 
However, there is the problem of whether there is only one 
univocal idea, procedure or result of picturing or visualising. But 
then Rabb (1975, p. 77) has observed that “there is a distinction 
between visualising and imagining in the sense between thinking 
in images and imageless thought.” To escape from this conceptual 
confusion, there is a need to disaggregate the idea of imagination 
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from imagination-induced forms of consciousness such as 
hallucination, delirium, neurosis, psychosis, delusion of 
persecution, delusion of grandeur, illusion, phobia, monomania, 
and megalomania. Hence, we cannot depend solely on imagination 
for security because “imagination alone cannot be trusted. Unaided 
imagination cannot differentiate fact from fancy. Indeed, it can 
breed illusions and delusions” (Perlman, 1995, p. 17).  
To escape from some of these problems we may hold that 
imagination must include a cocktail of experience among which 
are; the power to visualise, to extrapolate, to configure original or 
novel ideas, to initially solve real and anticipated problems and 
generally exhibit a methodical, meticulous and holistic perspective 
on things. The ultimate aim of imagination is, in the words of 
McLean (2000, p. 73), to “enable one to take into account ever 
greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine 
responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present 
circumstances and more creative in promise for the future.” 
Imagination makes sense only if it effectively and efficiently ties 
action with vision, which together then tilt towards strategies for 
the good of humanity.  
Palma (1983, p. 31) makes it clear that there is some connection 
between imagination and action. For Palma (1983, p. 31) “one‟s 
imagination can of course be guided by reason. But one‟s 
imagination, as a source of action, is not necessarily governed by 
reason. In this context, by „imagination‟ I do not mean the 
wherewithal by which we postulate possibilities (sometimes 
fantasies). I mean the ability to seize and act upon a certain course 
of behaviour.” Imagination, if it is to enhance or guarantee security 
must link up with action, values and visions.  
Vision, Action and the Security Imperative  
Security depends on imagination, and both are inevitably linked to 
the ideas of vision and action. The point must be made that without 
imagination, vision and action, no amount of information, prowess 
and resources can make a difference in the determination of things. 
The question of human action is significant when we note that the 
philosopher is interested in, and makes his or her contributions 
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through ideas. The philosopher must seek to understand ideas and 
how they come to exert so much influence on the lives of human 
beings. Ideas make more sense when they are defined as visions. 
Visions are attainable if they can be translated into action. This is 
why the analysis of the interface between vision and action is 
significant. 
To escape from the quagmire of defective and purposeless action 
such as is inimical to security we are definitely in need of 
rethinking the value of vision for action. According to Locke (1991, 
p. 49), the idea of vision can be referred to as “overarching goal, 
mission, agenda, central purpose; an ideal and unique image of the 
future”. A vision is an instrument or a means by which an 
individual or group integrates and guides his or their efforts. 
Without a vision, other qualities such as motives, knowledge, traits, 
skills and abilities will not amount to much. They cannot be 
appropriated, channelled or diverted innovatively and 
systematically for security inclined designs and goals. More than 
that, a vision is valuable since it is an idea and unique image of the 
future as elicited from a combination of current facts, dreams, 
dangers and opportunities.  
A vision retains ethical propensities that impute into it some 
normative and prescriptive value. In this way, a vision is a mental 
image of a possible and desirable future state of affairs. In the 
course of establishing a vision, there is a corresponding sharpening 
of the power of choice, discern alternate forms and chart a 
trajectory or direction. There can be no security without action and 
vision. This point is reinforced by Alaya (1977, p. 262) who says 
that vision could be contained within the simple principle that “bad 
external circumstances inhibit human development, and good ones 
foster it.” Hence, there is a need for a clear, distinct and positive 
vision if we are to have security. Furthermore, security can be a 
vision that an individual or a group possesses. It may be an 
outcome of the possession of certain gifts, talents, resources and 
abilities. Such a vision may be a positive or negative one and it will 
have the consequence of promoting the survival or annihilation of a 
person or a group at any level (cultural, physical, social, political, 
etc). 
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Vision without action is vacuous creative instinct. What do we 
mean by action especially in relation to the notion and operation of 
security? Grimm (1980, p. 235) holds that “actions are purposive, 
every action is performed by an agent with some purpose.” The 
end result of an action, physical or conceptual, is its purpose. 
Grimm (1980, p. 235) argues further using the illustration below, 
that if every action has a purpose, then every action is performed 
by an agent with a purpose. It is performed in order to achieve 
some goals, either the performance of another action, the bringing 
about of some state of affairs, event or condition or the obtaining of 
something or some experience.  
There is another dimension, which suggests that an action may 
have no purpose or that an action is its own goal. Some actions can 
be performed for their own sakes. Doing something for its own 
sake is doing it, just because one wants to. It is doing that thing for 
a reason and not doing it for a purpose. Thus, the issues of 
intention, intentionality, purpose, reasons, results, consequences, 
causes, performance, and so forth are key concepts necessary for 
the clarification of the meaning of security. However, we must 
transit to a discussion of the idea of values. 
Axiological Imperatives in the Quest for Security 
For vision and action to make sense and yield results, we must 
retain values that define the basis of our actions. The maintenance 
of security implies the protection and preservation of certain 
values. The significance of values for security can be drawn from 
the analysis of Appadurai (2002) who says that in the context of 
terrorism, “the attack on the World Trade Towers was not merely 
an effort to kill civilians. It was an effort to end the idea of civilians. 
And surely values are part of the carnage of the battles that have 
taken place since then” (p. 97). However, we can understand the 
nature of values better when we realise that every society sets for 
itself “an ideal form of life or an image which it seeks to attain and 
to which it constantly refers in the process of going through life” 
(Sogolo, 1993, p. 119). These ideal forms of life refer to the 
standards that guide the society. These standards, therefore, are 
known as the values of that society. 
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Given the variation existing in human social systems and its effect 
on the diverse values people uphold, it has been argued that “the 
issue of the nature of value is one of the central and most persistent 
problems of human existence” (Titus, 1970, p. 331). It is clear from 
the above that the existence of values is a generally admitted fact 
and, more importantly, values form the basis of all cultural life. 
They are in fact the foundation of all cognition and they constitute 
the category structure of the human consciousness” (Brunner & 
Raemers, 1937, pp. 87-88). To capture the essence of the notion of 
value, Perry affirms that a thing or anything has value when it is 
the object of an interest, which is a train of events determined by an 
expectation of its outcome (Perry, 1968, 336). Thus Titus (1970, p. 
331) affirms that when people make value judgements on the 
function of their values, their efforts are to be seen as an appraisal 
of the worth of objects. So he suggests that value can be found in 
terms of the positive property of having worth or being valuable. 
Singer, on his part, adds an extra dimension to the conceptual 
analysis of values when he suggests that a “person‟s values are 
what the person regards as or thinks important” (Singer, 1989, p. 
145). The same is applicable to the society insofar as a society‟s 
values are what it considers important. According to Ackermann 
(1981, p. 451) “values must, then, be considered in intimate 
connection with what could be called the collective interests of the 
very social groups that hold them.” By way of analysis, if value is 
that which is desirable, important or interesting, then something 
can be desirable but not necessarily important. Something can be 
interesting but not important. Something can be important but is 
neither desirable nor interesting. Something can be both important 
and desirable but not interesting. We have utility value, 
instrumental value, intrinsic value, ethical value and aesthetic 
value among others.  
Kupperman (1972, p. 259) has made the important point that “the 
aesthetic value depends on ethical values, and we become aware of 
the aesthetic value by means of awareness of ethical value”. For 
these reasons we must analyse our ideas of value and security 
further. A value is a belief about what is good or what ought to be. 
The link between values and security has been captured by 
Nietzsche (1986, p. 104) who says, “A society in which the members 
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continually work hard will have more security.” This suggests that 
the value of hard work or diligence and commitment can enhance 
security for a person or a group. The truth is that not every society 
or person shares the same values with others especially when these 
affect the conceptualisation of security. For instance, in most 
postcolonial African societies there cannot be security because of 
inefficiency, carelessness, lawlessness, ineptitude, laxity and levity 
of the part of the leaders and followers.  
This is why we can agree with a passage in the work of the popular 
novelist Clancy (1994, p. 542) that says, “Don‟t forget, that their 
culture is fundamentally different from ours. Their religion is 
different. Their view of man‟s place in nature is different. The value 
they place on human life is different.” In short, when the lines are 
drawn, we are forced to reconcile security with ways of life, which 
are most visibly seen in preexisting values. We can examine the 
character of existing values as opposed to how they ought to be. If 
the individual accepts a value for himself, then it becomes a goal 
for him. Many of the attitudes of the individual reflect his values or 
his conception of what is “good” or desirable. Shared values 
express our preferences for goods or things that are considered 
worth striving for. We are supposed to be interested in those values 
that can make life in society more peaceful, secure and progressive. 
We need to distinguish between individual values and shared 
values. We face the challenge of reconciling our values with the 
demands of modern change. We seek new values that can 
effectively provide identity and security for the individual and the 
group. 
The study of values is an inescapable imperative for rational and 
meaningful security theorising, human edification and national 
development. But then our vision, actions and values are clouded 
by the human nature, especially the negative manifestation of this, 
which, though a central part of life, is yet a major cause of the 
deliberate and accidental man-made problems facing humanity. 
What has human nature got to do with security? Before we answer 
that question, we need to establish a nexus between security, the 
value of human life and consciousness as a prelude to appreciating 
human nature. 
Ujomu and Olatunji                                      Security as Freedom in the Quest 
55 
 
Security and Human Nature  
Latham says that “security is an object of every group organisation 
if security is understood only in its elemental sense of the survival 
of the group itself in order to carry forward its mission” (Latham, 
1956, p. 236). Traditional security, which places so much emphasis 
on militaristic structures, tactical weapons platforms, elaborate 
war-game strategies as well as the cutting edge products of 
advanced science and technology could not meet some core 
security challenges. The reason is simple. It had overlooked a 
critical aspect of human existence in the security factor; which is 
human nature. The reason in this case is linked to the problem of 
the person and society in philosophy. We must share the view of 
Berry (1986, p. xiii) who insists that “social and political 
organisation has to accommodate itself to the human nature and 
not vice versa.” In other words, human nature is a primal symbol 
in the quest for security in human existence. The question that is 
crucial here then is what is human nature? This is a conceptual 
question, which has far reaching empirical consequences. 
According to Dewey (1974) human nature can be defined by the 
innate needs of human beings. Dewey (1974, p. 116) says that “I do 
not think it can be shown that the innate needs of men have 
changed since man became man or that there is any evidence that 
they will change as long as man is on the earth. Needs for food and 
drink and for moving about, need for bringing one‟s power to bear 
upon surrounding conditions, the need for some sort of aesthetic 
expression and satisfaction, are so much part of our being.”  
Furthermore, Dewey (1974, p. 118) points out that “pugnacity and 
fear are native elements of human nature. But so are pity and 
sympathy.” The quest for security and the context of human nature 
is tied to what Mill (1962) refers to as the natural sentiment of 
justice, which is defined by the interplay of the ideas of 
punishment, self-defence and sympathy. What is this idea and how 
does it connect with the conceptual clarification of security? Mill 
(1962, p. 306) states that “two essential ingredients in the sentiment 
of justice are, the desire to punish a person who has done harm, 
and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual 
or individuals to whom harm has been done. The desire to punish 
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…is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the 
highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; 
the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling of sympathy.” 
Furthermore, Mill (1962, p. 307) argues that “a human being is 
capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself 
and the human society of which he forms a part such that any 
conduct which threatens the security of the society generally is 
threatening to his own and calls forth his instinct of self-defense.” 
From the above analysis, there is a dimension of security as 
embodied in human nature and its operations. These natural 
feelings and instincts of humanity are themselves again constrained 
by some other factors. According to McShea (1979, p. 389) “men 
need what other animals do not, a method for the restoration of the 
functionality of feelings. Their freedom to imagine all possible 
things cannot, consistently with survival, entail enslavement to the 
necessity of action on the basis of an emotional reaction to each 
imagination.” The analysis of human nature takes a different 
dimension when Bacon (1972) sets the pedestals of the operations 
of human nature at two distinct but important levels. This, he does 
through the theory of idols. 
According to Bacon (1972, p. 92) human nature is captured by the 
idols. He asserts, 
The idols of the Tribe have their foundation in 
human nature itself, and in the tribe or race of men. 
The idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual 
man. For everyone (besides the errors common to 
human nature in general) has a cave or den of his 
own, which refracts or discolours the light of nature; 
owing to his own proper and peculiar nature.” 
Human nature and its significance for security make 
further sense only in the context of the social nature 
of man. According to Mackenzie (1963:35) “human 
association, societies are first formed for the sake of 
life; though it is for the sake of good life that they are 
subsequently maintained. The care of the young, the 
preservation of food and drink, the provision of 
adequate shelter and protection would suffice to 
Ujomu and Olatunji                                      Security as Freedom in the Quest 
57 
 
account for the existence of human societies (Bacon, 
1972, p. 92) 
This implies that society is necessary for some level of security for 
the human being. We also know from history that human 
associations have been the core sources of security crises or 
problems. For example, there is the crisis of women‟s security as 
seen in the operations of the family. There is the problem of 
tyranny and man‟s inhumanity to man, as seen in the internal 
operations of human actions in a society. There is the wider social 
insecurity generated by human intercultural conflicts among 
human associations. We can connect the human factor in 
cosmological security by illuminating what Grayling (2003, p. 131) 
says is the “murderous grip of humanity‟s various immemorial 
belief systems, intolerance, bigotry, zealotry and hatred.”  
All of these forms of security problems can be predicated upon the 
workings of human nature and human actions as clearly motivated 
by psychological, cultural or economic factors, among others. 
Another implication of the above analysis is that we confront the 
general problem of human nature as seen in the problems of our 
finitude and limitations as observed by philosophers through their 
descriptions of our ethical, human and metaphysical imperfections. 
We also confront the restrictive limitations of our peculiar human 
natures as individual men. And all of these taken together pose a 
stumbling block to our search for perfect security. As an example, 
the truly common human inability to foresee the future of things is 
a hindrance to personal and social security on a long-term basis.  
Behaviourism and the Defeat of Morality and Security 
Traditional security also suffers a shortfall by failing to take into 
adequate consideration the issue of human nature, especially as it 
further relates to mentalistic and non-observable aspects of human 
conduct, such as intentions, motives, and levels of moral judgment 
in the determination of how far anyone or set of persons could go 
in making a point using a terrorist action. In short, there is the 
problem of inner states of consciousness and other minds. Ayer 
(1973, pp. 346-347) has captured this problem of other minds in the 
statement that “the only ground that I can have for believing that 
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other people have experiences, and that some at least of their 
experiences are of the same character as my own is that their overt 
behaviour is similar to mine.” The problem with this kind of 
position is an irreconcilable binarism that has been aptly put by 
Malcolm (1973, p. 373) that “when I say „I am in pain‟, by „pain‟ I 
mean a certain inward state. When I say „He is in pain‟, I mean 
behaviour. I cannot attribute pain to others in the same sense that I 
attribute it to myself.”  
The particular problem of finding out whether we can know things 
concerning the self in the same way we can know things 
concerning the other is significant in itself. It is also significant for 
the determination of those features that truly make up the human 
agent or human being. The person is generally perceived to be 
made up of two parts, the physical and mental dimensions. These 
parts do interact. The problem arises because the way by which I 
can know myself as a self, subject or I, is different from the way 
that I can know other persons. I seem to know my experience 
directly without any intermediary. I know myself because I have 
inner states that essentially constitute my being or myself or my 
nature. These inner states that I have are exclusive to me. No two 
inner states are the same. No other person has access to my inner 
states except by my consent and through my disclosure. This is one 
of the essential definitive features of a human being; the almost 
intrinsic inaccessibility of the inner states. 
The ability of other persons to know my inner states depends 
significantly on whether I reveal certain experiences that define 
myself. Thus the details of my consciousness, experiences, plans, 
inclinations, desires and thoughts are virtually hidden from others 
except myself. This is the reason why criminals, looters of state 
treasuries, tyrants, terrorists, and so forth succeed. Sometimes, even 
aspects of the inner states of a person can be inaccessible or 
incomprehensible to oneself. We can appreciate this point by 
recalling the examples of actions tied to amnesia, hypnosis, sub-
conscious streams of experiences, beliefs, dream states, trances, 
dual personality, psychosis, mysterious experiences, hallucinations, 
to name a few. These unknown factors or qualities can be called up 
and utilised for specific ends. This can explain the emphasis on the 
psychological aspect of man in the attainment of projects. 
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There is a more serious problem of knowing the inner states of 
other persons, whose experiences are not directly available or 
accessible to us. To escape from this contradiction, the theory of 
behaviourism emerges as the idea that we can know the other by 
watching her behaviour or overt activities. The pitfall of 
behaviorism has been that there is a logical possibility of error. I 
can pretend or deceive others, if all that people can use to know 
that I am human is my overt behaviour. I can appear to be what I 
am not; I can hide my inner feelings or situation. This is one of the 
key features of human beings that pose a grave problem for 
security. We can therefore understand the ways by which an 
individual, groups and institutions can often be hoodwinked by 
strategies of impersonation, espionage, subversion, deception, and 
manipulation. In effect, the shortfall of behaviourism has paved the 
way for insecurity since one does not know the actual experience 
existing within the mind of the other and thus external behaviour 
cannot be a reliable or conclusive way of discerning that the other 
person is really or fully human.  
It is this possibility of error, which is both logical, and empirical, 
that paves the way for the possibilities of insecurity especially the 
ones constructed by humans. Also, our limitations or our finitude 
as humans can be linked to cultural, historical and biological 
shortfalls. These constraints pave the way for errors of judgment 
with respect to externally induced insecurity. This is called 
fallibility. This behaviourist challenge can be used as an 
explanation of terrorism and the problem of human nature as it 
relates to security. The challenge of behaviourism is itself an 
emphasis on the character of physicalism. For the physicalist, the 
things that we do and the things that are in this world are 
inevitably connected to the material or physical form of things. The 
only real things are physical things and the only influential things 
are material categories of consciousness and understanding. One of 
the strongest material causes of human action is the economic 
foundation of life. There is also the operation of the (normal or 
pervert) psychological framework of the human mind. Security can 
be threatened by greater ethno-cultural intolerance, religious 
irredentism, ideological demagogy, political manipulation, 
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economic deprivation and social anomie, all of which operate at the 
mentalist and physicalist planes. 
The Value of Human Life and Non-Selective Humanism as 
Foundations of Security  
What do we mean by the value of human life? What factors may 
threaten this value? What are the consequences of having or not 
having this value? To begin with let us review an example of how 
the value of human life is threatened by a selective humanism 
practiced in Africa. Selective humanism holds that all men are not 
equal, that some human beings are superior to others, that only the 
interest of a class or group should prevail over that of others. Is this 
really true? Is this really acceptable? Should we sustain such a view 
of human society or cosmology? The reasons for such a belief could 
be that there are some differences in wealth, education, racism or 
even ethnicity. Therefore, the idea selective humanism is that basic 
elements for building a stable and viable human society such as 
justice, security, etc should be determined by who is who 
selectively, and not by our common humanity. 
Let us review an African situation. A lot of scholars have pointed 
towards ethnicity; Ethnicity conceived as the Achilles heel of any 
African effort to establish and sustain security. Eme Awa (1993, p. 
58) rightly stated that “where societies are poorly integrated and 
primordial feelings are prevalent as in the states of Africa, the 
representatives of the various ethnic groups in the civil service may 
perceive the national interest mainly in terms of the welfare of their 
particular groups.” Thus we cannot but insist that ethnicity may 
need to be captured, bridled and vitiated. According to Odugbemi 
(2001, p. 70), “ethnicity undermines the fundamental values 
without which we cannot build a sane, serious, democratic 
society”. It has ushered in convoluted citizenship and attitudes 
suggestive of de-development and disintegration in a national 
context. It has encouraged resistance to change (Galey, 1974, p. 270) 
hence countermanding dominant modernising instruments such as 
the state, etc. Ethnicity has induced convolutions in social 
organisation and psychological predispositions. These have 
triggered questions about human survival and have forced a return 
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to the study of the basics of human nature. To overcome a 
recalcitrant human nature and inimical cosmological and political 
ethnicity, a new set of competing or higher values must be 
identified, entrenched and given legitimacy as directing principles.  
Other higher ideals and positive values must be encouraged and 
entrenched. If ethnicity is allowed to continue ravaging the spaces, 
then things will never progress in many parts of Africa. Thus far, 
ethnicity has largely brought prominent negative aspects to African 
societies, inhibiting morality, education, religion, law and other 
instruments that have changed societies for the better elsewhere. At 
a more fundamental level, the conflict of values arising thereof, and 
the various abuses and injustices arising from it, have ensured that 
there were no accepted and established rules for harmonising the 
diverse interests of the groups for national development such that 
the lack of shared beliefs, attitudes and values among the rulers 
themselves, the rulers and the ruled, as well as between the various 
segments of the Nigerian society ensured that insecurity, 
indifference and conflicts remained endemic in the nation. It is for 
these fundamental reasons that some groups have called for the 
aesthetical reconfiguration of the society through instruments such 
as the sovereign national conference, self-determination 
declarations, political realignments, and non-violent agitations for 
resource control. Other instruments include outright militia 
violence, social activism for attrition and persistently radical legal 
actions for widespread national liberation and transformation. All 
of these illustrate the dislocations, doubts and disagreement over 
the value that we should place on human life on an individual and 
collective basis (Ujomu & Olatunji, 2013). 
Central to the building a theory of the value of human life as a core 
element of security is the establishment of a process of 
appropriating the mechanisms of values and valuation. While 
value concerns the worth of something and the way we come to 
attain that worth, valuation is based on the decided weighted cost-
benefit of the placement of a price or primacy on something as 
important, desirable or interesting. In either of these ways the 
concrete concern is to discover how people can live in peaceful 
cooperation, obedience to laws, and amenability to organisation 
and loyalty to the state. As it is, the pervasive injustice, social 
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neglect of the marginal groups, poor responsiveness by 
government and truncated legislative representation can only lead 
to insecurity, disorder and instability in the body polity as we see 
today. The tragedy of a virulent multi-ethnicity that has bred 
conflicts and tension is bases on this question of satisfaction. This in 
turn raises the question of tolerance and dialogue as instruments 
for change in a multiethnic developing society (Ujomu & Olatunji, 
2013). 
The search for one or more philosophical principles for building a 
society is not new in human history or the history of human 
civilisations. In the unique case of America, it has generated a 
pragmatic philosophy that has ensured its distinctness, success and 
ascendancy in history. Other societies have done similar things 
some have even developed a viable philosophy by combining 
different elements of life borrowed from within and outside their 
national spaces. A philosophy of society is fashioned out of a 
climate of beliefs, behaviour and actions. The climate of a society 
depends upon the ideas that are prevalent at the time (Viscount 
Samuel, 1956, p. 208). Progress is made through invention of new 
global concepts (Harman, 1975, p. 122). Given that some of the 
more recently embraced paradigms of security analysis and 
planning that Africans utilise emanate from most parts of the world 
especially Europe, these ideas face the challenges of blending into 
the specific cultural nuances and social proclivities of African 
societies. 
What is special and appealing about a good social philosophy is 
that its basic principles can easily be adapted to the different facets 
of social and national life. It is this kind of philosophy that a society 
desiring peace and progress needs. The quest for a philosophy for 
Nigeria cannot be separated from the recognition of the value of 
human life. This basic principle will allow for the proper and 
effective utilisation of the principles of human dignity, solidarity 
(which is already embedded in the social practice of communalism) 
and subsidiarity (the freedom to release individual potential for 
personal and social growth). However, such a philosophy should 
abide by the core value of respect for the principle of the value of 
human life of all social members, understood as respect for the 
dignity of man in his freedom and responsibility.  
Ujomu and Olatunji                                      Security as Freedom in the Quest 
63 
 
The recognition of the value of life is an imperative, if any social 
philosophy is not to suffer the failures associated with the old 
communalism (which generated hegemony, anachronism, 
irredentism and disaffection) and crass pragmatism (which 
generated manipulation, irrelevance, otherness and cultural 
disdain) in the body polity. In the pursuit of an alternate 
philosophy of social life understood as a pristine value or an 
eclectic mix, the value of human life as a moral and political core of 
any viable social philosophy is to be taken as sacrosanct and 
consecrated. The practical consequence of the recognition of the 
value of human life is the intensification of the mechanisms and 
strategies for the establishment and sustenance of justice in the 
society. The ontology and axiology of justice will trigger the arousal 
of a deep belief in the power and capacity of the society, its 
custodians and its institutions to make a change towards the 
assurance of the freedom, well-being, opportunities and progress of 
the generality of the citizens. A philosophy of the value of human 
life is the totality of the principles, values, concepts and structures 
that will ensure that individuals give a fuller loyalty and 
commitment to the society and can have the best opportunities for 
actualising their potentials and making their contributions.  
All of these elements make sense when tied to the goals of security, 
which comes from the affirmation of life itself, and the value of life. 
The work of preservation of human and institutional value has 
become a major aim of security in a developing society. Security is 
nothing other than the totality of the strategies and efforts to place 
a value on human life, to make human life worth living. As Ekman 
(1963) has noted “affirming life means wanting to continue to live. 
There are elementary needs that must be satisfied in order that the 
organism may survive, and there are others (also elementary) 
which although not necessary to survival must nevertheless be 
satisfied if life is to be endurable” (Ekman, 1963, p. 57). 
If the value of human life in the context of the search for a national 
philosophy of life makes any sense, then this ought to be defined as 
a realisation and effort towards the rectification of the systems of 
economy, of infrastructures, structures and institutions so that 
change can occur. The changes that will attend the rule of the value 
of life may well translate into an increase in national pride, 
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commitment, contribution and national consciousness. This is 
because the concrete application of the principle of the value of life 
will require a change to a more humane and compassionate society 
that will take the provision of welfare and the release of potentials 
through the provision of opportunities more seriously. Even things 
such as wealth, money and materials will make sense on in line 
with their instrumental value, which is their use for the good and 
promotion of human life. This will mark a significant departure 
from the current value placed on money as an object of idolatry, 
oppression and consumerism in a deprived and constrained 
society. The recognition of the value of human life will translate 
into the emphasis on national and human security. The necessary 
repercussions of a conceptual and pragmatic rejection of selective 
humanism triggers a repudiation of personal and regime security 
will pave the way for the identification and insistence on higher 
values of collective social interest and organisation or institution 
wide ethical standards and practices.  
Conclusion 
We attempted to demonstrate that the problem of national and 
human security was a product of deficits arising from the way 
value of human life was promoted in various governments and 
state agencies wherein it seemed unable to consistently and 
institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well 
being of their citizens. We simplified and clarified the meaning of 
security and studied some practical and theoretical benefits that 
accrued from a conceptual analysis of security as freedom from 
evil. We examined a wide range of principles like values, visions, 
imagination, etc, that helped situate the parameters of social 
progress. We reviewed certain human values opposed to the 
operation of mere raw power, naked fear, unbridled egoism, crass 
military might and brute force as hitherto prevailing principles that 
directed the social order and thus truncated the quest for stable and 
viable security. We conceptualised the norms and parameters of a 
good social philosophy that would be adapted to the different 
facets of social and national life. We argued that a quest for a 
philosophy of social life or a conceptual foundation of security 
could not be separated from the fact that the value of human life 
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needed to be recognised. Such an understanding where values are 
prioritised will provide the conceptual basis of the practical 
realisation of the human dignity of the members of the society. 
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